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What the Governor’s Panel Learned†
Aradhana "Bela" Sood, M.D., M.S.H.A.*
I wear many hats. I am a clinician by background, and I do three days
of clinical work, so I am firmly grounded in a child and adolescent
psychiatry practice, and I was appointed to the Virginia Tech Review Panel
(Panel) by former Virginia Governor Tim Kaine four days after the tragedy
struck.1 I was surprised by the appointment to the Panel because forensics
is not my background. Nevertheless, as the work of the Panel unfolded, it
became clear that it was more of a systems approach that needed to be taken
in investigating the tragedy.2 I acknowledge the pain of the families who
are in the audience today. It is indescribable, the experience of the families,
students and staff at Virginia Tech, and all of my colleagues that worked on
this Panel report. Listening to Lucinda Roy, I was struck by her riveting
address not only in recognizing the need for utilizing this whole incident as
a learning experience, but really keeping our eye on the ball in recalling the
events as they occurred.3 The outcome that we require and want, within a
college campus setting, is a challenge to define as mental health, and is
really a small sliver of the entire pie of campus life that the Virginia Tech
administration is grappling with. The academic life of a university is
primarily focused on the task of teaching, and not focused on mental health
† Transcript of presentation given on Friday, November 6, 2009, at the Violence On
Campus Symposium, held by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice.
* Chair, Division of Child Psychiatry, Virginia Commonwealth University;
Professor of Psychiatry and Pediatrics, Virginia Commonwealth University; M.D., Jiwaji
University; M.S.H.A., Virginia Commonwealth University.
1. See generally VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH, APRIL 16, 2007: REPORT OF THE REVIEW Panel
PRESENTED TO GOVERNOR KAINE (2007), available at http://www.governor.virginia.gov/
TempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf (stating that following the incident of
April 16, Governor Kaine appointed experts such as Dr. Aradhana A. "Bela" Sood to the
Virginia Tech Review Panel on April 19).
2. See id. at 6 ("The Panel used a variety of research and investigatory techniques and
procedures.").
3. See LUCINDA ROY, NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 298 (2009) [hereinafter NO RIGHT
TO REMAIN SILENT] (commenting that "[t]hrough more open communication and a national
commitment to education, it is possible to make this campus and others safer than they are
currently. It’s not too late to engage in meaningful dialogue").
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issues.4 The inherent dilemma is the public safety issue versus personal
privacy.5 These are thorny issues with which we have grappled as we have
looked at this tragedy and how it has informed university policies in the
United States regarding mental health and the way we approach wellness in
campus life.
We had about a four month period within which we were tasked to
create the Panel Report.6 It was fast paced work with the first six weeks of
the Panel’s work together hampered by the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA): the legal twins that impeded effective
information sharing between the Virginia Tech officials and the
gubernatorial Panel.7 It took an Executive Order from the governor and
help from the law firm of Skadden and Arps to allow us to get the
information from Tech and other entities in order to move forward with the
investigation.8 The Freedom of Information Act was another legal act
which hampered the work of the Panel, because anytime you had more than
two people, it was necessary to invite the media, which turned things into
quite a circus.9 Nevertheless, the Panel really gave our best. We reviewed
more than about 1,100 documents, interviewed more than 220 people or so
in the process of the Panel’s work, and reported on much of it firsthand.10
We did not take anything as information that was given to us as the absolute
truth and I think that there was a tremendous amount of effort that went in
to corroborate each piece of information by supporting evidence. And these
are the Panel members, as you can see, the governor appointed people from
different walks of life who brought a different level of expertise.11 There
4. See generally Michael Luo, Senators to Discuss Preventing College Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007 (discussing the limitations of mental health resources on college
campuses).
5. See VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW Panel, supra note 1, at viii ("[F]ocus on an
individual’s privacy and confidentiality in higher education is sometimes so exclusive that it
can exclude the welfare of everyone else.").
6. See id. (listing the date of the final report’s publication as August, 2007).
7. See id. at 58 ("[I]nterpretation of HIPAA and FERPA were key in stopping
adequate exchange of information concerning Cho.").
8. See id. at 7 ("[T]he Executive Order of June 18, 2007, and the work of our outside
counsel ultimately allowed the Panel to obtain copies of, review, or be briefed on all records
germane to its review.").
9. See Virginia Freedom of Information Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3707(A) (2010)
("All meetings of public bodies shall be open.").
10. See VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 1, at 1 ("The Panel conducted over
200 interviews and reviewed thousands of pages of records.").
11. See id. at vii–viii (listing the members appointed to the Panel by Governor Kaine
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was a person from the FBI, a former president from higher education who
understood the hierarchy of the university and an emergency medicine
physician who looked into the management of injuries and fatalities post
event.12 Immediately after the tragedy, we had Tom Ridge, who really
helped us work through some of the politics and the bureaucracy of our
work.13 Probably one of the most important members of the Panel was
Carol Ann Ellis, who turned out to be one of the strongest advocates for the
families.14 She did a wonderful job of talking to the families and I have
learned so much from her in how to handle a variety of situations.
I will quickly go through the work of four months by distilling it into
twenty minutes. Many of you have read the report and so probably are
familiar with the life of Seung-Hui Cho: his early childhood, his move from
Korea to this country, and the fact that he was described very much as a
loner, a very quiet child who had a significant amount of anxiety, and who,
in his middle school years, was identified as needing mental health
intervention.15 And, as has been pointed out before, despite the cultural
issues, these parents were very adept at getting his mental health needs met
at the multicultural center up in Northern Virginia, where he received
mental health services for a long period of time.16 It was in his eighth grade
year, while he was being seen in play therapy, that he utilized modeling
clay and art work as part of the therapeutic work in the clinic.17 It is an
unusual thing for someone as old as that to use play therapy as a mode for
treatment.18 He was not verbal and he began to look more and more
depressed.19 His therapist noted that change.20 Within two months of that
the Columbine massacre occurred, he wrote within one of his essays that he

and their different backgrounds).
12. See id. and accompanying text.
13. See id. at viii (acknowledging the efforts of Panelists such as Tom Ridge).
14. See id. at 142 ("The governor designated Carroll Ann Ellis as the Panel’s special
Family Advocate.").
15. See id. at 21 (presenting a timeline documenting the early part of Cho’s life).
16. See id. at 21–22 (describing Cho’s experience receiving therapy at the MultiCultural Center for Human Services).
17. See id. at 34 (stating that Cho’s therapist used techniques such as "clay modeling,
painting, drawing, and a sand table at each session").
18. See id. ("Typically, this form of therapy is used with younger children who do not
have sufficient language or cognitive skills to utilize traditional ‘talk’ therapy.").
19. See id. (noting that Cho lacked sufficient verbal skills and persisted in isolating
himself during middle school).
20. See id. at 35 ("[H]is art therapist observed a change in his behavior.").
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wanted to "do a Columbine" in school.21 The guidance counselor and his
teacher suggested he see a therapist.22 The therapist was asked to follow up
on this issue, and recognizing the depression, referred him for psychiatric
help.23 He was put on Paroxetine, an antidepressant, and diagnosed with
depression along with the previous diagnosis of selective mutism.24 He
responded very well to that, and within eleven months was taken off the
medication because he was looking brighter and no longer depressed.25 He
went on to high school, graduated with a 3.58 GPA,26 with a number of
accommodations put into place, continued therapy into his tenth grade year
and then stopped.27 In repeated conversations with the counselors in the
high school, they felt that he had achieved academic success.28 Their only
suggestion to him was not to go into a large school like Virginia Tech in
Blacksburg, Virginia, because he would get lost in the crowd.29 He was
provided with the name of someone he could contact in case he ran into
trouble, which obviously he did not at that point, but there was recognition
of the fact that he would get into academic and emotional trouble in a large
school such as Virginia Tech.30 Nevertheless, because he had the requisite
grades for admission, they accepted him, and he enrolled at Virginia Tech.31
Freshman year went pretty well for him, other than the fact that his
parents would visit him every weekend.32 They were concerned about a
21. See id. (describing that Cho’s essay indicated his desire to replicate the events of
Columbine).
22. See id. ("The family was urged to have Cho evaluated by a psychiatrist.").
23. See id. (stating that Cho’s therapist reached out to a psychiatrist for Cho after
conducting a therapy session).
24. See id. ("The doctor diagnosed Cho with ‘selective mutism’ and ‘major
depression: single episode.’ He prescribed the antidepressant Paroxetine.").
25. See id. (describing the positive results Cho experienced from the new treatment
and the resulting decision of his psychiatrist to stop the use of medication).
26. See id. at 22 ("Cho graduate[d] from Westfield High School with a 3.5 GPA in the
Honors Program.").
27. See id. at 37 ("In the eleventh grade, Cho’s weekly sessions at the mental health
center came to an end.").
28. See id. at 39 ("His high school guidance counselor felt that his high school career
was a success.").
29. See id. at 37 (describing the recommendation of Cho’s guidance counselor for him
to attend a small school near home out of concern for Cho’s ability to transition in a large
school like Virginia Tech).
30. See id. and accompanying text.
31. See id. ("[Cho’s] GPA, along with his SAT scores (540 for verbal and 620 for
math registered in the 2002 testing year) were the basis for acceptance at Virginia Tech.").
32. See id. at 40 (stating that Cho’s parents visited every Sunday during his first
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roommate who was drinking too much, because they would see the beer
cans in the trash.33 Their basic focus was trying to get him into another
room in the dorm, which was achieved by the second semester of his
freshman year.34 At that point, the visits began to drop off.35 He had a 3.0
GPA in his freshman year.36 Sophomore year is when he decided that he
wanted to change his major and go into creative writing.37 He seemed very
excited about this.38 His high school counselors were very surprised when
we actually interviewed them about this choice, as he was always
recognized for his acumen in the sciences.39 His move to creative writing
was something he decided independently.40 His parents and sister were
interviewed and the sister was the main person I spoke to as she served as
the interpreter and a person who gave us insight into what type of a person
he was.41 Needless to say that his interest in writing delighted his family
because they felt that he had found a focused interest.42 His sister would
frequently see him on a computer, typing away, and he had seemed to find a
passion.43
As we all know, much of the psychological autopsy after his death was
patched together piecemeal because of the fact that we do not have much
information after his death.44 We believe the summer between his
sophomore and junior year is when the trouble began. He received a
rejection letter from a New York publishing house, at which point, although
semester).
33. See id. (describing the beer cans that Cho’s parents observed in his dorm room).
34. See id. (noting that Cho received his requested room change at the start of his
second semester).
35. See id. ("Parental visits became less frequent.").
36. See id. (listing Cho’s freshman courses and his ultimate achievement of a 3.00
GPA).
37. See id. ("He became enthusiastic about writing and decided he would switch his
major to English beginning the fall semester of 2005.").
38. See id. and accompanying text.
39. See id. ("English had not been one of his strongest subjects in high school.").
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41. See id. at 31 ("Cho’s sister, Sun, interpreted the answers to every question posed to
Mr. and Mrs. Cho.").
42. See id. at 41 ("His family was thrilled that he found something he could be truly
excited about.").
43. See id. at 22 (noting that Cho’s sister observed that he seemed very passionate
about writing).
44. See generally Ian Urbina, Va. Tech Gunman’s Mental Health Records Found,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009 (noting that Cho’s mental health records were unavailable for the
investigation following the 2007 shooting).
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he had switched his major to creative writing, he returned to Virginia Tech
that fall and began to have difficulty.45 One assumes that the rejection from
the New York publishing house set into motion his response, which was
getting more and more depressed and unhappy and dark in his thinking.46
This is what Eileen Ryan had been pointing out: the diathesis for emotional
problems based on one’s temperament and the stressor that precipitates the
illness, a combination of the two produces a perfect storm. And as we
began to piece together the information from the fall of his junior year, this
is when the telltale signs of the problem began, which Dr. Roy referred to.47
His behavior was unraveling in the classroom and he was taking cellphone
photographs of female students who were getting more and more anxious
and reporting it to the faculty.48 In fact, this was the first time that Nikki
Giovanni, English professor at Virginia Tech, noted that attendance in her
classroom was dropping.49 When she interviewed some of the female
students they said they were afraid of this guy who wore a hat and was
taking photographs of them.50 Graphically violent writings began to show
up in creative writing classes, stalking behavior began, and odd behaviors
with a suitemate were noted in which he took knives and would poke at the
carpet.51 His suitemates began to shun him, refusing to invite him with
them because they were embarrassed and also afraid of him.52
There were plenty of unusual behaviors that were popping up here and
there, which were being pointed out by faculty and that came to the
attention of the Care Committee at Virginia Tech.53 Professor Lucinda
45. See id. at 41 (describing the negative events following Cho’s receipt of the
rejection letter).
46. See id. ("Cho would become known to a growing number of students and faculty
not only for his extremely withdrawn personality and complete lack of interest in responding
to others in and out of the classroom, but for hostile, even violent writings along with
threatening behavior.").
47. See id. ("The fall semester of Cho’s junior year (2005) was a pivotal time.").
48. See id. at 43 (describing Dr. Giovanni’s discovery that Cho took unauthorized cell
phone pictures of students).
49. See id. at 42 ("Dr. Giovanni began noticing that fewer students were attending
class.").
50. See id. at 42–43 (noting that Cho disrupted Dr. Giovanni’s class by taking pictures
of other students and also by wearing a hat).
51. See id. at 42 (describing Cho’s disturbing behavior in Dr. Giovanni’s class and in
the dormitories).
52. See id. (noting that after several odd encounters with Cho, his roommates started
to distance themselves from him).
53. See id. at 43 ("The concern about Cho was brought before the university’s ‘Care
Team.’").
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Roy, chair of the English department, was the one who offered and actually
did the one-on-one tutoring so that he would not create a fearful
environment for the class.54 Rather than saying that he needed to quit the
creative writing class, she probably felt that if she were to give him more
one-on-one attention, things might turn around. It is critical to note, before
the records were found in the home of Dr. Miller, former director of Cook
Counseling Center (CCC), that there were three contacts with the CCC in
which three "triages" were done.55 The triages primarily gathered the
demographic information, and the recent records that revealed the
December 14th, 2005 contact also did not have any depth as far as the
psychiatric assessment.56 They noted that he had been committed and so on
and so forth, but beyond that, the information lacked usefulness.57 Based
upon the progress and lack thereof, the English department was really
pushing this young man to get help as he was having significant problems.58
But as we looked at the records, we saw that there was a lack of
communication and a lack of connecting the dots between the Care
Committee, CCC, faculty, and peers of Seung-Hui Cho. There was no
action from Cook Counseling or Judicial Affairs for the photos, emails, et
cetera, meaning that no one was able to put all of these things together.59
The sentinel event, which led to the commitment to Carilion hospital, was
based upon a negative interaction of Cho with a suitemate.60 The
suitemate’s father was a friend of the local police chief.61 The police chief
sent out someone who evaluated Cho, who in turn stated, probably

54. See id. at 44 (commenting that Dr. Roy agreed to privately tutor Cho as an
alternative to Dr. Giovanni’s class).
55. See id. at 23 (listing the three different periods over fifteen days that Cho was
triaged by the Cook Counseling Center).
56. See id. ("The staff psychiatrist dictates in his evaluation summary that ‘there is no
indication of psychosis, delusions, suicidal or homicidal ideation.’ The psychiatrist finds
that ‘his insight and judgment are normal. . . . Followup and aftercare to be arranged with
the counseling center at Virginia Tech; medications, none.’").
57. See id. and accompanying text.
58. See id. at 43 ("Dr. Roy contacted the Dean of Student Affairs, Tom Brown, the
Cook Counseling Center, and the College of Liberal Arts with regard to the objectionable
writing that Dr. Giovanni showed Dr. Roy.").
59. See id. at 52 (discussing the failure of the different resources in position to help
Cho to see the warning signs and communicate with each other).
60. See id. 46–47 (describing the disturbing communications one suitemate received
from Cho and the events that followed).
61. See id. at 46 ("The father spoke with his friend, the chief of police for
Christiansburg, who advised that the campus police should be informed.").
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mortified, that, "I might as well kill myself," after the police accosted him.62
At this point, the loop was closed. A prescreener came in to assess him and
he was hospitalized at Carilion.63 Basically the community service board
pre-screener’s (LCSW) write-up is probably the most comprehensive about
Cho’s mental status at that time.64 The use of the collateral information
from the suitemates as well as the reason for the concern is probably what
gives us a very good snapshot of what was going on with him. Fortunately,
a psychiatric bed was found very quickly,65 because that’s one of the gaps
in the mental health system nationally.66 A TDO (Temporary Detention
Order) was issued and he stayed there overnight.67 He was given a
diagnosis of mood disorder NOS (Not Otherwise Specified).68 To treat this,
he received one dose of Ativan, which is typically given to calm someone
down.69 He then was seen by an independent evaluator (a psychologist)
who spent about fifteen minutes with him.70 The decision was made to
discharge him.71 The special justice on the case, whose previous
background was in social work, was concerned enough that he committed
him to ordered outpatient psychiatric treatment.72 As we all know, those of
us who work in the mental health system, you can mandate outpatient [OP]
treatment, but there is no enforcement mechanism to assure that outpatient
62. See id. at 47 ("Following the visit from the police, Cho sent an instant message to
one of his suitemates stating, ‘I might as well kill myself.’").
63. See id. at 47 (stating that after a prescreener interviewed Cho, she recommended
that he be hospitalized at St. Albans Behavioral Health Center of the Carilion New River
Valley Medical Center).
64. See id. (noting that the prescreener’s report indicated that Cho was "mentally ill,
was an imminent danger to self or others, and was not willing to be treated voluntarily").
65. See id. (commenting that the prescreener successfully located a psychiatric bed for
Cho).
66. See id. at 56 (describing mental health professionals’ concern "that often psychiatric inpatient bed space is not available within the 48 hours").
67. See id. (noting that after the magistrate issued a TDO, Cho spent the night at the
hospital).
68. See id. ("The diagnosis on the admission orders was ‘Mood Disorder, NOS’ [non
specific].").
69. See id. ("Ativan was prescribed for anxiety, as needed.").
70. See id. ("The evaluator . . . believes that the independent evaluation took
approximately 15 minutes.").
71. See id. (noting that the psychiatrist decided Cho should be treated with outpatient
counseling).
72. See id. at 48 ("The special justice ruled that Cho ‘presents an imminent danger to
himself as a result of mental illness’ and ordered ‘O-P’ (outpatient treatment) ‘—to follow
all recommended treatments.’").
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treatment will occur.73 This remains a controversial area.74 Commitment
for mental health service delivery as an OP venue remains difficult to
implement in Virginia and nationally.75
The data utilized during the psychiatric assessment of Cho at Carilion
was primarily the patient self-report.76 Mental health professionals know
that the vast majority of the work that goes on in making an assessment
about an individual is very much based upon collateral data, because that
collateral data really informs the process of how you are formulating the
case.77 If we focus our attention primarily on the cross-sectional mental
status exam, we are going to get a very finite assessment.78 A good
psychiatric assessment needs to take collateral information from individuals
who know the patient well, and that does require a great deal of time.79 So,
there was no corroborative data gathered, the patient reported no drug or
alcohol abuse, which is usually a red flag for problems.80 What was really
missing was the lack of collateral information from police, the suitemates,
and the prescreener.81 There was no direct contact with the attending
physician, a typical phenomenon.82 The mission of the attending
psychiatrists and the independent evaluators are totally different.83 A
shared vision of what they were trying to achieve is missing, and there is a
73. See id. at 59 ("There is no contempt provision in the Virginia Code for those
noncompliant with involuntary outpatient orders.").
74. See id. at 58–59 (describing the disagreement over what additional guidance
should be given to supplement existing standards for outpatient treatment orders).
75. See generally id.
76. See id. at 22 (noting that "[a] staff psychiatrist at Carilion evaluat[ed] Cho,
conclude[d] he [was] not a danger to himself or others, and recommend[ed] outpatient
counseling. [The doctor] gather[ed] no collateral information").
77. See id. at 52 ("[C]hecking for collateral information . . . help[s] determine if [an]
individual truly pose[s] a risk or not.").
78. See id. at 55 (emphasizing that a four-hour cross-sectional mental exam does not
allow "sufficient time to gather meaningful collateral information from family, friends, or
other health care providers nor to secure proper evaluations for medical clearance").
79. See id. at 48 ("The psychiatrist also said that the time it takes to gather collateral
information is prohibitive in terms of existing resources.").
80. See id. at 48 ("The psychiatrist’s conclusion was based in part on Cho’s denying
any drug or alcohol problems or any previous mental health treatment.").
81. See id. at 56 ("[T]he independent evaluator for Cho had only the report from the
CSB [Community Service Board] pre-screener and no collateral information or medical
records.").
82. See id. ("As for the relationship between the independent evaluator and the staff
psychiatrist, they rarely see each other and they function independently.").
83. See id. ("The role of the independent evaluator is to provide information to the
court and the job of the attending psychiatrist is to provide clinical care for the patient.").

134

17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 125 (2010)

great deal of importance given to the assessment of the independent
evaluator and not to that of the attending physician, as the patient’s rights
are protected by the independent evaluator while the attending physician
focuses on clinical care.84 There is this great discrepancy of opinions of
how to assess the patients’ functioning during the commitment process.85
When we interviewed the psychiatrist who had worked on this particular
case, his feedback to us was that the privacy laws prevented him from
gathering collateral data.86 This is very typical of what psychiatrists say. It
is common to have no contact with the independent evaluator either
because these two roles are very different.87 To add to the problem,
surrounding universities around Virginia Tech also have threadbare OP
resources for mental health.88 Therefore, when a hospital comes up with a
treatment plan, the likelihood of it being followed through is very low.89
There is a lack of outpatient providers in both the private and public sector,
a finding endorsed by the report from the OIG’s office.90
Of course the records are available, but there was confusion regarding
who would follow Cho upon discharge.91 We do know that commitment
information was provided to CCC; Cho was asked to make the appointment
because CCC policy was that it would not accept any involuntary patients.92
84. See id. at 48 (noting that "privacy laws impede the gathering of collateral
information").
85. See NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, supra note 3, at 72 ("It was a violation of state
and federal laws to make public a student’s health and academic records. But . . . had the
administration taken it upon itself to lobby aggressively for a suspension of those laws,
given the scale of the tragedy, they would have received unanimous support.").
86. See VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 1, at 65 (discussing both HIPAA
and Virginia state law, and noting that health information is private and can only be
disclosed in exceptional circumstances).
87. See id. at 48 (describing the difference between psychiatrists and independent
evaluators).
88. See id. at 2 ("Virginia’s mental health laws are flawed and services for mental
health users are inadequate. Lack of sufficient resources results in gaps in the mental health
system including short term crisis stabilization and comprehensive outpatient services.").
89. See id. at 48 ("The lack of outpatient providers who can develop a post-discharge
treatment plan of substance is a major flaw in the current system.").
90. See id. at 54 (emphasizing that Virginia should study the community needs and
related costs of outpatient service necessary, and that "[o]nce this information is available it
is recommended that out-patient services be expanded statewide").
91. See id. at 58–59 (summarizing the conflicting reports, noting "[a]n appointment
had been scheduled by Cho with the assistance of the clinical support representative for St.
Albans. The representative . . . faxed a copy of the discharge summary to Cook.
Cook . . . contends that they did not receive any written documentation until January").
92. See id. at 48 (noting that it was a recent "practice" to have students be on the
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He got there and he kept his three o’clock appointment at CCC, and at that
point in time a small sort of passage indicates that they were aware of the
commitment.93 Then, Christmas break came and there was no followthrough.94 There was no follow-up of this individual.95 They had no idea
that there were parents who knew what was going on,96 and essentially in
the spring of 2006 to April 16, 2007, there were new problems in two of his
English classes.97 Incidents of threatening teachers, especially on April 16,
2006, in which there was an allusion to the Holocaust in one of his essays,
and that information was reviewed by the professor in the English
department.98 This was again not tied to previous incidents, again
underscoring the lack of a trickle-up or trickle-down phenomenon that is
essential for tying together relevant information to form an opinion about
this rather aberrant behavior in a student.99 There was no Care Committee
involvement and no information was shared with the parents either.100 The
reason why that is so important is illustrated by elements of this story that
almost run like a controlled experiment. We have a history regarding Cho
as a middle and high school student who at the time had very similar
problems to his time at Virginia Tech, but with appropriate interventions
was able to overcome whatever emotional difficulties he was experiencing
and was reasonably successful; while in college, there were no
interventions tried to address his regression. And as we saw, the results
phone to schedule an appointment made by a court at Cook Counseling Center).
93. See id. at 23 (noting that on December 14, 2005, Cho "ma[de] and ke[pt] an
appointment with the Cook Counseling Center").
94. See id. (stating that in January the Cook Counseling Center received a psychiatric
summary from St. Albans, after which "[n]o action [was] taken by Cook Counseling Center
or the Care Team to follow up on Cho").
95. Id.
96. See id. at 22 (referring to the parents of several female students whom Cho
harassed).
97. See id. at 23 (referring to problems with Professor Carl Bean and Professor Lisa
Norris).
98. See id. (referring to a conversation between Professor Bean and Cho, during which
Cho "follow[ed] the professor to his office, rais[ed] his voice angrily, and [was] asked to
leave"); see also id. at 51 (noting that "in [an] April 16 letter Cho wrote numerous times that
Bean ‘went Holocaust on me’").
99. See id. at 2 ("During Cho’s junior year . . . numerous incidents occurred that were
clear warnings of mental instability. Although various individuals and departments within
the university knew about each of these incidents, the university did not intervene
effectively. No one knew all the information and no one connected the dots.").
100. See id. at 43 ("At the Care Team meeting . . . [t]he perception was that the
situation was taken care of and Cho was not discussed again by the Care Team. The team
made no referrals of Cho to the Cook Counseling Center. The Care Team did nothing.").
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were disastrous.101 The parents were asked what would they have done had
they come to know that their son was committed to a hospital for suicidal
thoughts, and their response was a definite "we would have taken him out
of the school and we would have got treatment for him."102 And there
again, hindsight is always 20/20, nevertheless, there’s no reason to suspect
that that would not have happened because despite their immigrant status
and cultural background, these parents had been able to find him the kind of
treatment he needed in the past.103
Spring of 2007 he amasses the ammo, the firearms, and the rest of the
events we all know about.104 How did this happen? What were Cho’s
specific issues? What were the system failures? Are these code failures?
Where did these failures reside? And what can be learned, and how does
that inform policy, is what the work of the Panel really focused on. As far
as the role of the university, basically no one connected the dots to pick up
on the danger signals.105 The question of the loco parentis role of the
university versus the notion of emancipated young people who need no
adult interference is a major policy struggle for universities.106 This is
something that we have talked about this morning, so I will not belabor it,
but it is a big issue because, transitionally, we are dealing with older
adolescents rather than young adults, who have, in theory based on
chronological age, achieved maturity, but psychologically may be quite
vulnerable to the stress of transition and becoming independent of
previously existing support systems.107 It is necessary that universities

101. See id. at 36–38 (detailing the history of Cho’s successful mental counseling
during his high school years).
102. See id. at 49 (quoting Cho’s parents as saying, "We would have taken him home
and made him miss a semester to get this looked at . . . but we just did not know . . . about
anything being wrong").
103. See id. ("From [Cho’s parents’] history during the high school years, we do know
that [Cho’s parents] were dedicated to getting [Cho] therapy consistently and also consented
to psychopharmacology when the need arose.").
104. See id. at 24 (describing the process by which Cho acquired his weapons and
ammunition).
105. See id. at 3 (highlighting Report’s "Findings of Fact" that noted "[n]o one [in the
Virginia Tech administration] knew all the information and no one connected the dots").
106. See NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, supra note 3, at 278–84 (summarizing the
conflict between an attempt at in loco parentis on behalf of a university versus a young
adult’s need for autonomy and independence).
107. See id. at 278 (noting that on college campuses the "lack of a stable, nurturing
community that foster[s] interaction with older people can mean that a young person may
have little guidance from anyone").
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recognize this and have a coherent policy to address these issues.108 On the
role of the Care Committee, I have to say that when Virginia Tech
presented its Care Committee to the Panel, on paper it looked terrific.
However, in reality, the kind of information that I was getting from faculty
who we interviewed, and from parents of students who had left Virginia
Tech because of substance abuse or mental health problems, did not reflect
that this university was responsive to psychological issues that their student
body was grappling with.109
My personal goals regarding using the Virginia Tech tragedy were to
look at the system’s gaps in mental health, because that is really the larger
system’s issue that trickles down to a campus such as Virginia Tech, and
that this tragedy focuses the national eye on the overall system’s gaps in
mental health. We all know now that since the tragedy, the TDO
commitment process has been changed.110 It moved from imminent
dangerousness to significant risk because Virginia has been very stringent
in defining imminent risk and hence many individuals did not receive the
type of care needed when they were critically ill.111 This gives a lot more
flexibility in a person meeting criteria for a commitment.112 Certainly the
safe harbor provisions, that when information is provided with good faith,
information should be shared, have also helped with inter-professional
information sharing.113 The safe harbor provisions help in reducing the fear
around HIPPA and FERPA.114 Now, I do think that the risk assessment for
108. See id. at 281 (suggesting that "open communication" is the "best approach," not
only "in defense" against student attacks on schools, but also as a means for parents to know
and guide their children through this difficult transitional period).
109. See VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 1, at 2 (acknowledging that in the
situation of Cho, as in others, "the university’s Care Team failed to provide needed support
and services," due to "lack of resources, incorrect interpretation of privacy laws, and
passivity").
110. See NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, supra note 3, at 293 ("In April 2008, less than a
year after the shootings, Governor Kaine signed omnibus mental health bills to reform and
fund strained mental health services, [and] adjust legal commitment criteria.").
111. . See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-808 (2010).
112. See NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, supra note 3, at 294 ("The new legislation
should result in a more coordinated and thoughtful response to troubled students, particularly
as it relates to such things as the sharing of information, commitment criteria, student
records, and parental notification.").
113. See VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 1, at 68 (emphasizing the
importance of "safe harbor" provisions in privacy laws that "insulate a person or
organizations from liability . . . for making a disclosure with a good faith belief that the
disclosure was necessary to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the person involved or
members of the general public").
114. See NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, supra note 3, at 171 (noting that schools
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violence in institutions through threat assessment teams should be
considered important in campus life. This issue has to be approached in a
systematic way. One framework could be viewing this from a primary,
secondary, and tertiary prevention model that includes a student, faculty,
and staff code of conduct, against which students’ behavior ought to be
assessed. Faculty are not therapists and they are not mental health
counselors,115 but they need to be able to recognize aberrant behavior when
it does occur, and there needs to be some sort of a feedback loop to the dean
of students affairs or some entity that takes on the administrative burden of
ensuring that the issue gets addressed through a team with expertise in
triaging the student to the appropriate resource in the university. It is very
important for faculty mentors who have identified an issue that a feedback
loop be in place that acknowledges that an action has been taken. The
communication should not divulge the details of the intervention. But it is
essential that the faculty know that something has been done. Now, when
the student comes back, and the aberrant behavior continues on, then the
faculty needs to determine, based on whether the student’s behavior falls
within the range of acceptable student code of conduct, whether they are
going to dismiss the student from the class, or go revisit the issue with the
dean of students. The university should create a watertight—but just—loop
of communication in which the roles of these individual entities, including a
student, are made clearer and explicit, all tied to an acceptable code of
conduct. The dean of student affairs or the administrative body should be
expected to triage the individual through threat assessments to a counseling
setting or the police, but the bottom line is to hold faculty, staff, and
students all to a code of conduct on campus. Human resources for staff
code of conduct, faculty through ratings on professionalism in their
performance evaluation, and students by the dean of students, would create
a culture on the campus that will promote safety. I feel that these
mechanisms and ways of organizing campus life in which mental health is
approached in the same way as physical health will be important to the
evolution of a responsive and safe culture within a university.
There is an intense amount of heavy lifting that we as a nation have to
do around the issue of campus mental health.116 Not only campus mental
confused about what information can be shared under HIPPA or FERPA are "likely to err on
the side of caution and decide not to share information because it can make them vulnerable
to litigation").
115. See id. at 143 (quoting a New York Times article on the Virginia Tech shootings,
noting that neither teachers nor the university are a "part of the mental health system").
116. See VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 1, at 54–60 (providing a detailed
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health, but mental health in general, because as has been said before, this is
an incident that can occur anywhere.117 Refining how we go about
screening and intervening when incidents arise from emotional and
behavioral issues will help us take a step towards preventing sentinel events
and tragedies such as this event and mature as a nation. The linking of
physical health with mental wellbeing is an integral part of the health
reform that we are contemplating as a nation. Unless we link the two
together, mental health will always remain stigmatized, and will not get the
kind of place it deserves as we consider resource allocation.

list of recommendations of how to improve campus mental health, put forth by the review
Panel).
117. See NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, supra note 3, at 296 (emphasizing the global
nature of mental health problems and the easy spread of ideas, noting "the problems we face
here are being encountered elsewhere . . . "). "[Movies and the Internet] have enabled a kind
of ideological miscegenation . . . . A young man in Finland can watch videos posted by a
young man in Virginia." Id.

